

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5362

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 AMMAN 2278

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E.O.11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PGOV, JO, US, XF
SUBJECT: TALK WITH HUSSEIN--AREA SITUATION

SUMMARY: I HAD A FRANK TALK ALONE WITH HUSSEIN MARCH 8. HE IS CLEARLY DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE NEAR FAILURE OF THE SADAT INITIATIVE AND SEES ONLY A SEPARATE AGREEMENT OR A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESS AS ALTERNATIVES. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. CAN KEEP THE SADAT PROCESS ALIVE, BUT THAT IT MUST ACT TO BRING BEGIN AROUND ON TERRITORIAL WITHDRAWAL ON THE WEST BANK, SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE PALESTINIANS, AND STOPPING SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES EVERYWHERE. HE CLEARLY DESPAIRS OF OUR BEING ABLE TO DO IT AND NOTES EVEN THE LABOR GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL WAS TOUGH AND HARD ON TERRITORIAL WITHDRAWAL. HE SEEMS TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT WE ARE BEHIND SAUDI ACTIVITY WHICH IS SQUEEZING JORDAN FINANCIALLY. I TRIED TO SET HIM RIGHT AND BELIEVE I MADE SOME PROGRESS. HE WENT AGAIN THROUGH HIS CONCERNS FOR THE SECURITY OF JORDAN WITH GROWING LEVEL OF ARMS IN THE HANDS OF ALL OF HIS NEIGHBORS WHILE THE JORDAN PROGRAM "STAYS LEVEL." HE INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT ATHERTON MISSION HAD BEEN TRYING TO PROBE FOR JORDANIAN CONCESSIONS AT A TIME WHEN
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BEGIN WAS STIFFENING HIS POSITION HE WAS IRRITATED BY THIS. HE SAID AGAIN JORDAN HAS ONLY ONE POSITION. I POINTED OUT TO HIM THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRE-CONDITIONS FOR ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS AND POSITIONS TAKEN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. I SAID HE SHOULD THINK ABOUT WHAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO IF BEGIN DOES MOVE. BEGIN WOULD NOT MOVE ALL THE WAY

TO JORDAN'S POSITION OF TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AT THE
OUTSET OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE SHOULD THINK ABOUT WHAT
IT WAS THAT WOULD GIVE HIM CONFIDENCE THAT NEGOTIA-
TIONS WERE GOING SOMEWHERE. KING INDICATED THAT
HE WAS COUNTING AS MUCH AS EVER ON THE PRESIDENT
AND HE IS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF WRITING TO
PRESIDENT CARTER BEFORE THE BEGIN VISIT. END SUMMARY.

1. HUSSEIN SAY ME MARCH 8 AT MY REQUEST JUST AFTER CLOSE OF
AUSTRIAN STATE VISIT HERE. MEETING LASTED LITTLE
OVER 45 MINUTES.

2. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW WITH HIM SOME
OF THE POINTS WHICH ROY ATHERTON MADE WHEN HE WAS
HERE IN AN EFFORT TO TRY TO GET HIM TO TALK FURTHER
ABOUT THE QUESTIONS ON HIS MIND. I WAS SUCCESSFUL
IN GETTING HIM TO OPEN UP A LITTLE MORE ON HIS
CONCERNS AND WORRIES--ALL OF WHICH WILL BE FAMILIAR
TO YOU. I HOPE ALSO I WAS ABLE TO GET HIM TO THINK
IN MORE REALISTIC TERMS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

3. WE BAGAN BY EXAMINING WHERE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
MIGHT LEAD THE AREA. HE SAID THAT HE SAW THREE
POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. SADAT'S INITIATIVE
HAS FLOUNDERED AND IS COMING VERY CLOSE TO FAILURE.
THE U.S. IS THE ONLY POSSIBLE FACTOR WHICH CAN
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GET THE ISRAELIS TO CHANGE THEIR PRESENT VIEW AND
KEEP THE INITIATIVE ALIVE. A SECOND COURSE OF ACTION
WILL BE THAT SADAT WILL DECIDE THAT THE COMPRE-
HENSIVE PROCESS IS GOING NOGHRE AND STRIKE OFF IN
THE DIRECTION OF A SEPARATE AGREEMENT.

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4. FINALLY, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPLETE
FAILURE WITH NO AGREEMENT POSSIBLE AT ALL.

5. KING SAID HE RECOGNIZES THAT THERE ARE THREE
MAJOR AREAS IN WHICH THE ISRAELI POSITION SEEMS TO
BE HOLDING BACK PROGRESS ON THE SADAT INITIATIVE.
ONE HAS TO DO WITH THE ISRAELI INTERPRETATION OF
THE APPLICATION OF 242 AND THE FACT THAT WITHDRAWAL
ON THE WEST BANK IS NOT REQUIRED BY IT AND THAT THE
BEGIN GOVERNMENT HAS NO INTENTION OF MAKING ANY
SUCH WITHDRAWAL. KING SAID THAT OVER PAST YEARS
HE HAS TRIED MANY TIMES WITH THE ISRAELIS TO GET
A WITHDRAWAL. THEY WOULD NOT GIVE HIM A DISENGAGEMENT
AGREEMENT AFTER THE 1973 WAR. THEY DID SUGGEST
SOMETHING LIKE THE ALLON PLAN BUT NOT AS A DISENGAGE-
MENT, ONLY AS A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT FINAL AGREEMENT
ON THE WEST BANK. HE OF COURSE COULD NOT DO THAT,
PARTICULARLY AFTER RABAT.

6. IN ADDITION, THE NEW ISRAELI POSITION TAKEN BY
BEGIN WAS EXTREMELY OMINOUS FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW.
FIRST, HE HAD DRAWERS FULL OF WRITTEN PRESIDENTIAL
ASSURANCES ABOUT WHAT 242 MEANT IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE 1967 ARRANGEMENTS. HE RECALLED HOW HE HAD WORKED
TO CONVINCE PRESIDENT NASSER TO ACCEPT 242 ON THE
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BASIS OF U.S. ASSURANCES. SECONDLY, SOURCES WHICH
HE TRUSTED WHO HAD CLOSE CONTACTS WITH BEGIN TOLD HIM
THAT BEGIN STILL COVETED THE EAST BANK OF THE JORDAN.
UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THIS COULD ONLY MEAN THAT
THE U.S. WAS CONTINUING TO ARM THE ISRAELIS TO TAKE
OVER NOT ONLY THE WEST BANK BUT PERHAPS TO MAKE A
TRY FOR HIS LAND IN THE EAST BANK.

7. I POINTED OUT OUR STAND TO HIM ON THE AIRPLANE DEAL AND HE
SAID THAT WHILE IT WAS HELPFUL TO SAUDI ARABIA AND
EGYPT AND TO THE ISRAELIS, THERE WAS NOTHING IN IT FOR
JORDAN. HE THEN SPENT A LONG TIME TELLING ME OF
THE DANGERS TO HIS COUNTRY AND THE FACT THAT ALL
AROUND HIM PEOPLE ARE RE-ARMING AND INCREASING THEIR
MILITARY STRENGTH WHILE THE U.S. TREATS JORDAN ON
A BUSINESS-AS-USUAL BASIS. HE DID MENTION THAT

U.S. GRANT AID HAD GONE DOWN IN 1979 AND THAT LOANS
WERE VERY HARD FOR HIM TO GET GUARANTEED. HE
ELEBORATED ON THIS THEME AT SOME LENGTH.

8. HE THEN TOLD ME THAT THE U.S.
PROGRAM TENED TO PUT HIM MORE AND MORE IN THE HANDS
OF THE SAUDIS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE SAUDIS WERE IN
EFFECT DOING AMERICA'S BIDDING BY MAKING IT HARD
FOR HIM TO GET THE LOANS GUARANTEED IN ORDER TO
RECEIVE THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT WHICH THE U.S.
WAS PROVIDING UNDER THE REGULAR PROGRAM. WITHOUT SAYING IT,
I SENSED HE FELT THIS WAS INDIRECT PRESSURE ON HIM TO JOIN THE
NEGOTIATIONS.

9. I PULLED HIM UP SHORT HERE AND SAID THAT WE WERE
CONTINUING TO PROVIDE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF ASSISTANCE.
WE HAD GREATLY EXPANDED ECONOMIC AID. WE WERE LOOKING VERY
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CAREFULLY AT THE ADDITIONAL
REQUESTS HANDED TO THE SECRETARY AND HE SHOULD KNOW
WE WOULD GIVE THEM EVERY CONSIDERATION. IN ADDITION,
I WANTED HIM TO KNOW HE WAS WRONG IF HE WAS IMPLYING THAT WE
WERE EXERTING INFLUENCE THROUGH THE SAUDIS IN AN ATTEMPT
TO TRY TO GET HIM TO DO SOMETHING ON THE NEGOTIATIONS.
I SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY, WE HAD TALKED
WITH THE SAUDIS ABOUT HELPING JORDAN ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, UP
UNTIL THE POINT WHERE THE SAUDIS HAD GOTTEN VERY
IRRITATED AND UNHAPPY AND ASKED US TO CUT IT OUT.
AT THAT POINT WE FZLT WE WERE NOT DOING EITHER JORDAN
OR THE U.S. ANY FURTHER GOOD AND HAD DECIDED TO STOP.
BUT CONTRARY TO HIS POSSIBLE CONCLUSION THAT WE
WERE WORKING AGAINST HIM THROUGH THE SAUDIS, WE
HAD IN FACT OVER THE LAST SEVERAL MONTHS ON A NUMBER
OF OCCASIONS TALKED TO THE SAUDIS ABOUT FURTHER
ASSISTING JORDAN IN THE LIGHT OF JORDAN'S MONEY
PROBLEMS.

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10. I THEN MOVED THE CONVERSATION BACK TO OUR EFFORTS TO GET PALESTINIAN LANGUAGE INTO ANY DECLARATION AS A SECOND IMPORTANT POINT ON WHICH WE WERE WORKING. THE KING RESPONDED THAT EVEN THERE IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IN THE ASWAN LANGUAGE WE HAD PULLED BACK FROM THE IDEA OF SELF-DETERMINATION. I SAID THAT NEITHER HE NOR WE WANTED TO SEE AN INDEPENDENT PLO STATE EMERGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. OVER PAST YEARS A LARGE NUMBER OF SELF-DETERMINATION EXERCISES CONDUCTED BY THE UN HAD NOT EVEN INCLUDED AN INDEPENDENCE OPTION. HE BROKE IN AT THIS POINT TO SAY THAT IF WE FAILED TO INCLUDE THE INDEPENDENCE OPTION WE WOULD ONLY BE GUARANTEEING RADICAL PALESTINIAN BEHAVIOR WHICH WE WANTED SO MUCH TO GUARD AGAINST. I SAID THEN HE SAW CLEARLY OUR DILEMMA. WE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A WAY THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. TO AVOID HAVING A SITUATION WHERE THE PALESTINIANS HAD NO CHOICE OR DETERMINATION IN THEIR OWN FUTURE ON THE ONE HAND AND ON THE OTHER TO AVOID AS WELL ANYTHING THAT COULD DEVELOP OR CREATE A STATE WHICH WOULD BE A PERMANENT DANGER TO BOTH JORDA AND ISRAEL. HE SAID THAT IF WE WANTED TO DO THAT WE OUGHT TO COME OUT FIRMLY FOR SELF-DETERMINATION, BUT THEN WORK WITH HIM TO TRY TO BUILD UP JORDAN AND ITS FOLLOWING ON THE WEST BANK TO THE POINT WHERE SUCH A POSSIBILITY, WHILE IN THEORY ABLE TO OCCUR, IN PRACTICE WOULD NOT OCCUR.

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HIS THEME HERE MATCHED HIS EARLIER THEME ABOUT JORDAN NEEDING HELP FROM THE U.S. AND BEING LEFT BEHIND BY US IN THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DEFENDING ITSELF IN THE REGION.

11. I TURNED NEXT TO THE QUESTION OF SETTLEMENTS AND POINTED OUT THAT THIS ISSUE HAD CAUSED A FUROR IN THE U.S.. WE HAD SPOKEN OUT CLEARLY AND WE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT OUR SPEAKING OUT HAD HAD A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THE ISRAELIS. THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT SHORT TERM FREEZES WHICH MIGHT BE A TACTICAL ERROR IN THE U.S., BUT THEY WERE NEVER-THELESS CLEARLY AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE IMPACT

IT HAD CAUSED.

12. I THEN MOVED TO THE QUESTION OF JORDAN AND THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD BEEN DISTURBED BY OUR APPROACH IN THE ATHERTON VISIT. BEGIN HAD DRAWN BACK ON 242 AND WE WERE COMING TO HIM, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR PAST ASSURANCES, THAT 242 MEANS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK TO ASK WHAT HE COULD GIVE. HE SAID JOREAN HAD ONLY ONE POSITION. THERE WAS NOTHING TO GIVE, PARTICULARLY WHEN BEGIN HAD TAKEN SUCH A FIRM POSITION ON NO WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WEST BANK. HE CONSIDERED OUR ASKING HIM TO DO SO A TACTICAL EFFORT TO WHITTLE HIM DOWN. HE ASKED THEN ABOUT WHAT HAS SADAT TOLD YOU ABOUT WHAT HE WOULD DO ON THE WEST BANK. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW IN DETAIL BUT BELIEVED THAT SADAT WAS STICKING TO HIS GUNS AND NOT WAIVERING ON THE ARAB POSITION ON THE WEST BANK. HE SEEMED SOMEWHAT RELIEVED.

13. I TOLD HIM AS ARTFULLY AS I COULD THAT I THOUGHT JORDAN SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE PUBLIC

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POSITION FOR THE DAYS AHEAD. THE KING HAD ALWAYS BEEN IN FAVOR OF NEGOTIATION AND SETTING TOUGH PRECONDITIONS FOR BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS WAS NOT HIS REGULAR OR NORMAL POSTURE. WE COULD UNDERSTAND IT IF HE MAINTAINED A HARD NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT I SAID I HOPED PERSONALLY HE WOULD NOT CONTINUE TO INSIST ON "ALL OR NOTHING" PRECONDITIONS FOR ENTERING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

14. I EXPLAINED THAT IF THERE WERE ANY ISRAELI MOVEMENT OR FLEXIBILITY, AND WE HOPED VERY MUCH AS ROY ATHERTON HAD SAID THAT IN THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE BEGIN VISIT WE COULD ACHIEVE THIS, SUCH MOVEMENT WOULD CLEARLY NOT BRING THE ISRAELI POSITION SQUARELY ON TOP OF HIS OWN OF REQUIRING FULL WITHDRAWAL. BUT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF WITHDRAWALS FROM THE WEST BANK. IF THAT WAS THE CASE, THEN WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHAT HE THOUGHT HE WOULD NEED IN ORDER TO HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE GOING SOME PLACE. IT WAS IN THAT CONTEXT THAT ATHERTON WAS ASKING HIM FOR DETAILS OF HIS POSITION ON ENTERING THE NEGOTIATIONS, NOT TO TRY TO OBTAIN SOME SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION WHICH ONLY HE COULD GIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. THE KING SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS APPROACH. I ASKED HIM TO THINK ABOUT WHAT HE MIGHT NEED OR WANT TO JOIN NEGOTIATIONS, IF WE WERE ABLE TO OBTAIN A DECLARATION AND THE PROGRESS THAT THIS WOULD INVOLVE IN THE ISRAELI POSITION.

15. THE KING ALSO INDICATED SOME IRRITATION TO HIS
BEING ASKED TO NEGOTIATE ON THE BEGIN SELF-RULE PROPOSAL. HE
SAID THAT THE PROPOSAL IS SO FAR FROM WHAT CAN BE
CONSIDERED THAT HE CANNOT POSSIBLY RESPOND TO IT.
HE TAKES OUR PAST REQUESTS TO DO SO AS AGAIN ANOTHER EFFORT
TO TRY TO WHITTLE HIM DOWN WITHOUT THE OTHER SIDE HAVING
ACCEPTED THE FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE OF 242: TERRITORY FOR PEACE.

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16. I ASKED HIM FRANKLY WHETHER HE FELT HE HAD BEEN
PRESSURED IN ANY WAY BY US. HE SAID NO THAT HE
HAD NOT. HE WENT BACK AGAIN TO THE THEME THAT HE IS TERRIBLY
WORRIED ABOUT FAILURE. HE SAID THAT HE CAN UNDERSTAND
THAT COMMITMENTS MADE BY THE U.S. PRESIDENCY IN 1967,
WHEN IT WAS APPARENTLY MONOLITHIC AND OMNIPOTENT,
COULD NOT NECESSARILY BE KEPT IN LATER YEARS. HE
REPEATED HIS ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE ARABS'
STRONG DEPENDENCE ON THE U.S. TO SAVE THE PROCESS.
HE SAID THAT AFTER VIET NAM, WATERGATE AND DOMESTIC
PROBLEMS ALL FOREIGN LEADERS KNOW THAT THE U.S. CANNOT
DO EVERYTHING IN EVERY PLACE. NEVERTHELESS, JORDAN
HAD BEEN PRESSURED BY THE U.S. TO ACCEPT 242 AND HE
WAS SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT HAVING HIS POSITION
FURTHER WHITTLED AWAY. HE DID NOT LIKE BECOMING
A SCAPEGOAT FOR THE REFUSAL OF THE ISRAELIS TO MOVE.
HE RESENTED THE PUBLIC AND PRESS ATTACKS ON HIM IN THE U.S.
AND ELSEWHERE AS A ROADBLOCK IN
THE PEACE PROCESS AND SAID HE
PRESUMED THIS WAS BING PUSHED BY THE ISRAELIS.
HE ENDED THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION BY SAYING THAT
HE HAD SPOKEN SO FRANKLY BECAUSE HE WNATED US TO
UNDERSTAND EXACTLY HOW HE FELT AND HE WANTED TO AVOID

FAILURES IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE U.S. AND A LACK OF
UNDERSTANDING. HE INDICATED HIS WORRY OVER THE COMING
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BEGIN VISIT, NOTED HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS AND SAID HE
WANTED PRESIDENT CARTER TO REALIZE THIS.

17. I SAID THAT I WOULD BE REPORTING IN FULL OUR
CONVERSATION BUT THAT THE PRESIDENT IN THE PAST
HAD INVITED HIM TO BE IN DIRECT COMMUNICATION, AND IF
HE FELT SO STRONGLY THEN IT WAS CLEARLY A MATTER ON
WHICH HE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER COMMUNICATING DIRECTLY
WITH THE PRESIDENT. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN CONSIDERING
THIS IDEA HIMSELF AND WOULD BE GIVING IT FURTHER THOUGHT.
I SAID THAT IT WOULD BE THE MOST CERTAIN WAY TO PUT
HIS IDEAS AND CONCERNS DIRECTLY BEFORE THE PRESIDENT.

18. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN IS FEELING
A GOOD BIT OF HEAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. HE DOES
NOT SEE WHY WE CANNOT DO MORE WITH BEGIN AND THE
ISRAELIS AND OBVIOUSLY PLACES GREATEST IMPORTANCE
ON THIS FACTOR. HE ALSO HAS CONCLUDED THAT OUR
ACTIVE INTEREST IN HIS POSITION IS MORE DESIGNED TO
SEE WHAT CONCESSIONS HE WILL OFFER RATHER THAN TO
ELUCIDATE HIS REQUIREMENTS FOR JOINING THE
PEACE PROCESS. I HOPE OUR TALKS HAVE BEGUN TO GET HIM TO
THINK ABOUT THE DIFFERENCES. HE ALSO IS MORE
CAUGHT UP THAN EVER IN THE SECURITY DANGERS TO HIMSELF AND
HIS COUNTRY. HE TICKED OFF AGAIN FOR ME THE FACT
THAT THE SYRIANS AND THE IRAQIS ARE PILING IN SOVIET
WEAPONS AND THAT WE ARE DOING THE SAME FOR THE
ISRAELIS. HE HAS LITTLE FAITH THAT ANYTHING THE
SAUDIS GET OR DO WILL EVER BE USED TO HELP HIM.
HE SEEMS GENUINELY ALARMED ONCE MORE ABOUT ISRAELI
EXPANSIONISM AND THE IDEA THAT IF MILITARY ACTION
OCCURS JORDAN IS THE SOFT-SPOT THAT CANNOT BE HELD AND THAT IT
WILL PROVIDE GOOD BARGAINING MATERIAL FOR THE ISRAELIS WHICH CAN BE
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TRADED BACK TO THE ARABS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE WEST
BANK AS BEGIN HAS MADE CLEAR HE WANTS TO DO.
THE KING HAS COME VERY CLOSE TO SEEING SADAT MISSION AS
A FAILURE. HE DID NOT SAY SO BUT HE ASSUMES SADAT'S NEXT STEP
WILL BE TO GO IT ALONE. HE DID MAKE CLEAR AGAIN
HIS DEEP CONCERN THAT ALL THE ISRAELIS AND THE EGYPTIANS
WANT IS TO HAVE HUSSEIN COVER FOR THEM IN A BILATERAL SOLUTION

OF THE PROBLEM. HE ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE WAS IRRITATED
AND SHOCKED WITH THE BRITISH WHO INTERPRETED CROWN
PRINCE HASSAN'S IDEA ON RECIPROCITY AS BEING THAT THE JORDANISN
WOULD BE WILLING TO LEAVE GAZA AND JERUSALEM TO ISRAEL IF
THEY COULD WORK OUT SOME KING OF TIES WITH ARAB VILLAGES
WITHIN THE 1967 BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL. WHILE OUR
CONVERSATION CLEARED THE AIR I AM NOT CERTAIN IN
MY OWN MIND WHAT HUSSEIN WILL DO NEXT. I HOPE THAT
I HAVE GOTTEN HIM TO FOCUS ON PUBLIC REITERATION OF HIS
POSITION RATHER THAN ON LASHING OUT AT US OR ARTICULATING
INCREASINGLY TOUGH PRECONDITIONS FOR ENTERING
NEGOTIATIONS. HE IS CERTAINLY CONVINCED THAT BEGIN,
NOT HE OR SADAT (OR EVEN THE SYRIANS), IS THE PRIMARY
STUMBLING BLOCK TO THE PEACE PROCESS NOW MORE THAN
EVER BEFORE AND WE ARE THE ONLY PARTY THAT CAN SHIFT BEGIN.

19. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT PASS TO ATHERTON DEQEATION,
TEL AVIV, AND CAIRO.
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